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Island Creek v. Rodgers and
Mine Subsidence Liability
INTRODUCTION

In October, 1982, the Island Creek v. Rodgers' decision
addressed a new area in Kentucky law: damages from abandoned
mine subsidence. The court held that a mine operator was strictly
liable for subsidence damage even though superseding causes
might have occurred. 2 This decision demonstrated a willingness
on the part of the Kentucky Court of Appeals to extend strict
liability for subsidence to any and all damages which might
occur as a result of underground mining operations.
While the court's decision seemed appropriate given the facts
of Island Creek, the general extension of subsidence liability
opened the door for unfair imposition of liabilities on underground mining concerns. Since support systems which were effective at the time of abandonment may be rendered ineffective
by subsequent mining in the area, a mine operator could be
forced to pay for the damage to surface structures unless he can
prove that his subjacent support was in fact adequate until
damaged by the mining practices of others.
This comment explores the history of mine subsidence liability in the United States and analyzes the Island Creek decision's departure from established standards, concluding that the
redefinition of "natural state" was unnecessary, since the same
result could have been reached while avoiding much confusion
and more litigation. This comment will also discuss the new
subsidence regulations on underground mining, 3 which are designed to lead to better mining practices and a decrease in the
likelihood of subsidence damage. Furthermore, the detailed
documentation 4 now required for issuance of mine permits will
be addressed to show how companies such as Island Creek Coal
can establish that the subsidence damage was caused by other
prior mining operations. Finally, this comment will examine the
644 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
Id. at 344.
See infra notes 59-80 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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impact of Kentucky's new subsidence insurance lawsS on the
rights and liabilities of affected parties.
I.

ORIGINS OF SUBSIDENCE LIALIBTY

One of the consequences of underground mining is subsidence. 6 Subsidence is defined as "any movement of the soil from
its natural position." ' 7 When coal or other minerals are removed
from the subsurface strata, gravity may cause the rock overlying
the remaining cavity to collapse, thus leading to a disturbance
of the surface soil.8 This disturbance causes breaks and cracks
in the land itself, and more importantly, may cause damage to
buildings, wells, and other structures in or on the overlying
strata. 9
The first case to recognize an absolute right of subjacent
support for surface owners was Harris v. Ryding'° in 1839.
There, the English court noted that when the surface rights have
been severed from the mineral rights, the surface owner retains
the right to have his property supported in its natural state."
Courts in the United States and England continue to recognize
this absolute right: if subsidence occurs, the mineral owner is
liable for damages caused by his removal of the subsurface
support.' 2 It is no excuse that the mining operations were conducted with due care or within normal mining practices." In a
suit for damages, it is not necessary for the surface owner to

I See infra notes

81-87 and accompanying text.
Blazey and Strain, Deep Mine Subsidence - State Law and the Federal Response,
I E. MiN. L. INST. 1.1 (1980).
6

7

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 817 Comment h (1977). This is the definition

of subsidence cited in the Island Creek decision.
8 Blazey and Strain, supra note 6, at 1.1-.2.
9Id. at 1.3; see also Comment, Common Law Rights to Subjacent Support and
Surface Preservation, 38 Mo. L. REv. 234, 236 (1973).
0 151 Eng. Rep. 27 (Ex. 1839).
" See, e.g., C. LINDLEY, 3 LINDLEY ON MIES § 818 (1914); Comment, supra note
9, at 236-37.
,2 Some authors have referred to this right to subjacent support as a "third estate
in land" which may be retained by the surface owner or deeded to the mineral owner.
See CAs,"mu AND LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY

1297 (1969).

,1 E.g., Marchetti v. Lumaghi Coal Co., 142 N.E.2d 815 (111.App. Ct. 1957); Elk
Horn Coal Corp. v. Johnson, 249 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1952), modified, reh'g granted, 263
S.W.2d 124 (Ky. 1953); James Coal Co. v. Mays, 8 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1928); Noonan v.
Pardee, 50 A. 255 (Pa. 1901).
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prove negligence in mining operations; he need only show that
the damages were caused by mine subsidence. 4 This right to
subjacent support, however, may be waived by a surface owner
if such waiver is incorporated in the deed itself. 5
The law concerning a surface owner's right to support of
buildings on the mined land is less clear. Early cases held that
absolute liability for subsidence only applied to the land in its
"natural state"-a term which did not include any buildings or
improvements.' 6 Later courts extended the "natural state" doctrine to include buildings "in existence or in contemplation at
the time the estates were severed.' ' ' 7 Thus, where no buildings
existed at the time of the severance, the surface owner's absolute
right to subjacent support only covered support of the unburdened surface.' 8
Case law concerning damage to buildings erected after mining has begun is even more confusing. Early cases held that
mine operators were not liable for damages to subsequently
erected structures.' 9 As more mined areas were developed, however, several theories were advanced to allow recovery for a
surface owner. Some jurisdictions held the mine owner liable
unless he could prove that the weight of the surface structures
contributed to or caused the subsidence.20 Others held that it
was not necessary for a surface owner to prove negligence in the
mining operations, but only that the damages were caused by
mine subsidence. 2' In such jurisdictions, therefore, subsidence
itself was prima facie evidence of negligence that had to be

" Nisbet v. Lofton, 277 S.W. 828 (Ky. 1925); see generally 3 LINDLEY, supra note
11, at § 819; Beck and Sigwerth, Illinois Coal Mine Subsidence Law, 29 DEPAUL L.
REv. 383 (1980) (discussion of negligence and subsidence).
,1 In most jurisdictions, the waiver of subjacent support must be expressly stated;
however, a few courts have held that the waiver may be implied by the wording of the
deed. A waiver of subjacent support does not allow negligent or malicious removal.
LAW OF
Marsh, Liabilities Incident to Mining and Milling Operations, in 4 AMeAn
Mn INO at § 21.14 (1982) (general discussion of waiver); Annot. 32 A.L.R. 2D 1309,
1311-12 (1953).
6 See Marsh, supra note 15, at § 21.13.
" 54 AM. JutR. 2D Mines and Minerals § 201 (1971).
" See Nisbet, 277 S.W. 828; Annot., supra note 15 at 1316-17.
19See, e.g., Wilms v. Jess, 94 Il1. 464 (1880); Brewster, 55 N.Y. at 538.
Wilms, 94 Il1. 464; see Nisbet, 277 S.W. 828; see also Annot., supra note 15 at
1317-18.
21 Annot., supra note 15 at 1318-19.
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refuted by proof of underground conditions.? In Pennsylvania,
where mining operations causing subsidence are prohibited by
statute, 23 a mine operator has even been held liable for damages
to homes over a mine which was closed and later reopened.24
Other jurisdictions have been less kind to surface owners. In
Colorado, a surface owner must prove actual negligence to recover for damage to surface structures.25 Elsewhere, several cases
have held that if the surface owner knew or should have known
that subsidence had occurred or was likely to occur, the mine
owner has a valid defense for damages to subsequently erected
buildings.2 6 It is obvious, therefore, that a surface owner's ability
to recover depends on the views of the particular jurisdiction
where the property is located.
Historically, surface owners have been able to recover for
damages to the land in its "natural state" on a theory of strict
liability. The same theory holds true in most jurisdictions for
structures in existence at the time the estates were severed. However, the addition of structures after severance may make it
more difficult to recover on a strict liability theory.
II.

Island Creek v. Rodgers

With the decision of Island Creek v. Rodgers,2 7 Kentucky
law concerning strict liability for subsidence was extended and
clarified .2 The Kentucky Court of Appeals held Island Creek
Coal Company and Cimarron Coal Corporation jointly liable
for subsidence damage to a surface owner's home. Island Creek
was held liable, not for subsidence caused by a working mine,

Marchetti, 142 N.E.2d at 816.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.4 (Purdon 1966).
24 Wright v. Buckeye Coal Co., 424 A.2d 728, 731 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
" Colorado Fuel and Iron Corp. v. Salardino, 245 P.2d 461, 464-65 (Colo. 1952).
Salardino was, however, overruled by Gladin v. Von Engeln, 575 P.2d 418 (Colo. 1978).
"Cf. Kangas-Jacobsen Dairy v. Lloyd-Smith, 62 N.W.2d 915, 916 (Minn. 1954)
(allegations that plaintiff knew or should have known that subsidence had occurred as
a result of mining is good against a demurrer that knowledge does not state a defense).
But cf. Island Creek v. Rodgers, 644 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (fact that
plaintiffs built their home over mines, knowing that subsidence had occurred, not
material).
644 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
n See North-East Coal Co. v. Hayes, 51 S.W.2d 960 (Ky. 1932); West Kentucky
Coal Co. v. Dilback, 294 S.W. 478 (Ky. 1927); Nisbet, 277 S.W. 828 (discussions of
Kentucky law prior to Island Creek).
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but for damage which occurred over an abandoned mine. Cimarron was held liable for blasting damage, although the damage was actually caused by subsidence.
Although Island Creek owned the underground mine situated
beneath the Rodgers' home, the company had ceased mining
operations in 1963 and had abandoned the mine in 1971.29 The
Rodgers' home was built on the surface over the mine in 1966.30
Cimarron, meanwhile, was engaged in strip mining operations
near the area 3 ' and used blasting to loosen the overlying rock.
This blasting was the action that apparently led to the damage
to the Rodgers' home. 2 Island Creek, however, was also held
liable for the damage because its mine underlying the surface
had subsided. 3
At trial, Island Creek's experts testified that adequate coal
had been left in the seams to support the surface in its natural
state,3 4 and that the subsidence had been caused by the Cimarron
blasting. 5 Conversely, Cimarron's experts contended that the
blasting had no effect on the underground mines, but rather
that the subsidence had been caused by Island Creek's failure to
leave adequate subsurface support.3 6 Since there was no undisputed testimony vindicating either company,3 both were found

" "Abandoned workings" are defined as "excavations, either caved or sealed,
that are deserted and in which further mining is not intended," while "inactive workings"
are defined as "all portions of a mine in which operations have been suspended for an
indefinite period, but have not been abandoned." KRS § 352.010 (1983). Island Creek
Coal Co. had purchased the mine from the West Kentucky Coal Co., which had begun
the original mining operations at that site in 1905. Island Creek, 644 S.W.2d at 342.
Island Creek, 644 S.W.2d at 342.
",Id. Cimarron engaged in strip mining operations within 5,600 feet to 23,000 feet
of the Rodgers' home.
32 Id. at 343. "The Rodgers testified that . . . there was a shaking and jolting of
their home followed by a terrific blast. The next morning they discovered their damage."
Id.
" Island Creek, 644 S.W.2d at 342-43.
1,Id. at 342. The expert for Island Creek stated that the support should have been
sufficient to last for at least 100 years. Id.
" Id. at 343 (expert contended that Cimarron's blasting resulted in the fracture of
the supporting pillars).
30

* Id. Cimarron's experts testified that Island Creek used unacceptable mining
practices and allowed water to accumulate in the abandoned mine.
" Id. The court noted that every claim or defense made by one defendant was
refuted by the other defendant.
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strictly liable for the resulting damages" in keeping with established law.3 9
The court's definition of the "natural state" of the land is
novel and somewhat troublesome. While Island Creek argued
that the "natural state" of the surface applies to the time when
the coal rights were severed, 40 the court defined "natural state"
as "the condition of the surface, including reasonable and foreseeable improvements thereon, at the time the-coal is severed,
not from the fee, but from the earth."' 4' In making this distinction, the court rejected the approach taken by a majority of
jurisdictions42 and extended the strict liability of mine operators
to include even those improvements made subsequent to the time
the coal was last removed. Since the time of severance of surface
and mineral estates may be far removed from the time of actual
mineral removal, the implications of the Island Creek decision
may have far-reaching effects on mine operators.
The court's redefinition of "natural state" seems unnecessary.4 3 The idea of structures being "in existence" or "contemplated" is not so limiting that the court needed to change
established Kentucky law to reach the same decision. By merely
expanding the definition of the "future structures" clause, the
court could have held that the building of a home on what was
farmland at the time the surface and mineral estates were severed
was not completely inconceivable." The court, however, chose
to hold the mine operator liable for damage to structures dating
from the time that coal was last taken from the earth.

" Id. at 342. Each defendant was assessed $25,000, but Cimarron was also assessed
$45,000 in punitive damages.
Island Creek, 644 S.W.2d at 344 (citing West Kentucky Coal Co. v. Dilback,

294 S.W. 478 (Ky. 1927)).
,o Id.

Id.
I (Emphasis added.)
41See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
• See Wright v. Buckeye Coal, 434 A.2d 728 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981). Buckeye Coal
operated a mine which first opened in 1920. The mine was closed, but reopened in 1968.
In the interim, several homes were built over the mine. After reopening, subsidence
occurred during retreat mining, damaging several of the overlying homes. Buckeye was
held liable for the damage under common law strict liability and under Pennsylvania's
Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, 52 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1406.4 (Purdon
1966). Although this case is not identical to Island Creek, the time frame is approximately
the same, and "natural state" was not redefined.
- See Island Creek, 644 S.W.2d at 343 (discussing the condition of the farmland
where the Rodgers' home was eventually built).
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Since a mine may be in operation over a long period of time,
a mine operator can never be certain as to what standards will
be applicable. Indeed, what are considered appropriate measures
today may be totally unacceptable fifty years from now. It is
therefore necessary to give mine operators a more definite rule.
Perhaps "natural state" should be defined to include a specific
time limit for subsidence damage strict liability. Surface owners
should be notified of this time limit when purchasing the property or selling the mineral interests. This "statute of limitations"
would serve a twofold purpose: to notify surface owners of the
existence of the subsurface mine and its possible consequences,
and to give mine operators a specific time frame in which to
study possible uses of the surface.
Although it may be difficult to accomplish this legislatively
or judicially, it would be possible for a mine operator to include
such a clause in his agreement with the surface owner when
purchasing or leasing the mineral estate.4 5 If mine operators are
merely leasing the mineral estate, they should provide that the
time limit will run with the land so that subsequent surface
owners will be aware of and party to the agreement.4 In any
case, the boundaries of the "natural state" definition should be
more clearly defined by the courts to insure more uniform treatment.
The second troublesome element of the Island Creek decision
is the application of strict liability concepts to a situation where
subsidence damage was not caused by faulty extraction, but
rather was caused by another mining operation in the area.
Island Creek contended that Cimarron's blasting had caused the
remaining support to collapse-even though that support would
have otherwise been adequate.4 7 Although the court concluded
that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Cimarron's
blasting had indeed caused the subsidence, " one must note that
Cimarron was held liable for one-half of the subsidence dam-

0' See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Since waivers of all rights to subjacent
support have been upheld, it would seem logical that a waiver after a certain period of
time would also be upheld.
- The mineral lessor or owner needs to provide that the waiver runs with the land,
and is not personal to the present owner/lessor.
Island Creek, 644 S.W.2d at 342-43.
"Id.
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age. 9 Therefore, the fact-finder must have believed that Cimarron's blasting had at least contributed to the subsidence.' 0
The primary issue then becomes how an underground mine
operator can protect himself against subsequent mine practices
by others which may cause his once-adequate supports to fail.
With the Island Creek decision resulting in increased liability for
underground mine operators for surface damages, an added
burden is placed on underground mining operations. In making
plans to control or avoid subsidence, such operations must take
into consideration all future uses of the surface directly above
and near the mine site. Furthermore, since it is nearly impossible
for one mine operator to dictate the practices of another,"
underground miners will have to leave support which will not
only withstand the ravages of time, but which will also withstand
the possible effects of other mining operations in the area. 2
Although the decision reached by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals may be the proper outcome given all facts and circumstances of this particular case, application of the general rule of
strict liability to include abandoned mines affected by other
mining is far too broad. While the surface owners' interests in
having adequate support are superior to the mineral owners'
right to mine, 3 the mine operators deserve some protection
against liability for damages not caused by their own negligence.
However, now that strict liability principles have been combined
with a liberalized definition of "natural state," an operator's
potential liability is greatly increased, and it will be difficult for
a mine operator to shift this liability to other miners.
Undoubtedly there will be other cases with facts similar to
those in Island Creek which will give the Kentucky courts the
opportunity to reevaluate this court's rationale. Hopefully, these
future cases will lead to a narrower construction of the rule.
Alternatively, an evidentiary element could be added to the
ruling, whereby courts could create a rebuttable presumption of

IId. at 342.
Id. at 347.
, This is particularly true when the mine in question has been abandoned before
the other operations begin.
Leaving enough coal in place to protect against all subsidence, however, could
lead to a surface owner action against the mine operator for failure to mine in a
reasonable and workmanlike manner.
" West Kentucky Coal Co. v. Dilback. 294 S.W. 478 (Ky. 1927).
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strict liability for subsidence damage, allowing a company to
avoid liability if it could demonstrate that the mining practices
of another caused the damage. With sufficient evidence, a mine
operator could thus shift the liability burden to the responsible
party.
Another problem, however, would face the underground mine
owner: the availability of evidence which would prove that adequate subjacent support had been provided but had been damaged by another subsequent mining activity. Where the mine is
old or has been abandoned, it is difficult to prove the former
adequacy of such supports. Current legislation 4 requiring documentation of the underground support systems for new mining
operations should alleviate this problem in the future. Such
documentation will only be useful, however, in cases where a
co-defendant can be found whose mining practices adversely
affected the underground support. If there is no co-defendant,
strict liability will still apply to hold the underground mine
operator liable for subsidence of surface areas over his mining
operation.
Perhaps the justice of such an outcome is best viewed in
light of public policy. In recent years, public awareness of mining's effects on the environment has led to the passage of legislation greatly increasing the regulation of mining operations."
The demand for more stringent standards culminated in the
passage of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977 (SMCRA), 5 6 which places tighter restrictions on surface
mining and the surface effects of underground mining." Even
the court's decision in Island Creek reflects the growing attitude
that mine operators who profit while damaging the land should
be required to bear the consequential costs.
III.

RECENT LEGISLATION CONCERNING SUBSIDENCE

In the past several years, numerous pieces of legislation have
been passed concerning coal mining and its effects on the envi-

See infra notes 59-80 and accompanying text.
5, See generally Blazey and Strain, supra note 6 at 1.11-.15 (discussion of federal
and state regulations).
" See, e.g., Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), Pub.
L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982)).
"7 30 U.S.C. §§ 1265 and 1266 (1982).
14
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ronment.18 Although mine operators initially complained about
the great financial burden which such massive state and federal
regulations placed on them, these regulations should lead to
better mining practices which should in turn, lead to a decrease
in future litigation.
Although SMCRA deals primarily with the effects of strip
mining, there are portions of the act which deal specifically with
the surface effects of underground mining. 9 Contained in these
provisions are special references to subsidence. SMCRA requires
that states "adopt measures consistent with known technology
in order to prevent subsidence ... except in those instances
where the mining technology used requires planned subsidence
in a predictable and controlled manner."60 The Act also requires
an operator to obtain a permit, secure a performance bond on
all operations, 6 ' and cease mining if there is evidence of subsidence. 62
The permit requirements of SMCRA are stringent. 6 In the
permit application, the operator must determine whether structures or renewable resource lands exist within the area." If these
structures or areas do exist, the operator must detail what type
of mining will be used. 65 A map must be provided which shows
where planned subsidence will occur, 66 and a detailed description
of the subsidence control measures to be taken must be given.67
Mine operators must also publish an advertisement of the intent
to mine which shows the precise areas to be affected.m The
public is then allowed to raise objections or call for a department
conference.69 It is only after all of these conditions are met that

See supra note 56.
30 U.S.C. § 1266 (1982).
30 U.S.C. § 1266(b)(1) (1982).
61 30 U.S.C. § 1259 (1982).
30 U.S.C. § 1266(c) (1982).
30 U.S.C. § 1256 (1982).
30 C.F.R. § 784.20 (Supp. 1984).
30 C.F.R. § 784.20(a) (Supp. 1984).
30 C.F.R. § 784.20(b) (Supp. 1984).
6, 30 C.F.R. § 784.20(d) (Supp. 1984). Several measures designed to control subsidence are listed, including a monitoring of subsidence levels within the mine.
-6 30 C.F.R. § 817.122 (Supp. 1984). This notice must be given at least six months
before mining begins.
- 30 U.S.C. § 1263(b) (1982). Any person with an interest may make comments
on the permit application and request an informal conference.
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70
a permit to begin mining can be issued.
SMCRA further provides that any state may assume control
over its mining regulations by submitting its own program. 7 ' The
state program may impose more stringent requirements than does
SMCRA, but any state regulations found to be inconsistent are
superseded by federal standards.72 Kentucky has implemented
such a program.7 While the Kentucky statute does not specifically address subsidence issues'74 such issues are addressed in the
regulations promulgated under the statute. 7 These regulations,
which closely follow the language found in SMCRA, 76 impose
stringent requirements for mitigating the effects of subsidence
on surface structures. 77 In addition to showing how they plan to
control subsidence, mine operators must either make provisions
to repair or replace damaged structures or purchase insurance
policies which will fully compensate surface owners for subsidence damage.7 8 Furthermore, mine operations must be periodically inspected by state officials to insure compliance with the
regulations.7 As an added guarantee of accountability, each
company must post a bond which will not be released until all
permit requirements have been fulfilled. 80 Thus, both state and
federal agencies impose thorough controls on mining operations
in an attempt to decrease subsidence damage.
The Kentucky General Assembly recently passed another piece
of legislation which should have a substantial impact on subsidence damage litigation. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 304.44 establishes a fund for mine subsidence insurance. 8'
This fund, which will be administered by the state, 82 is intended
to "cover losses arising out of or due to mine subsidence within

" 30 U.S.C. § 1256(a) (1982).
7 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982); see 30 C.F.R. § 732.15 (Supp. 1984).
7230 U.S.C. § 1266(a) (1982).
11 Ky. REV. STAT. § 350.151 (1983) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
71 Id.
405 Ky. ADMIN REOs. 8:040E § 26 (1982) [hereinafter cited as KARl.
See KRS § 350.151 (1983); 405 KAR 3:010-050E (1982).
405 KAR 8:040E § 26(c) (1982).

Id. at § 26(cX4).
405 KAR 10:040E § l(g)(4) (1982).
KRS § 304.44 (Supp. 1984).

KRS § 304.44-020(2) (Supp. 1984).
KRS § 304.44-050 to -080 (Supp. 1984). Payments are to be made within ninety
days of the filing of the claim.
R2
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this state." 83 Under the statute, insurance policies issued for a
home or other structure must contain separate premiums for
insurance covering subsidence damage. As a result, most property insurance policies issued in Kentucky will contain coverage
for subsidence damage.
Such coverage is not guaranteed, however; certain Kentucky
counties are exempt from this policy if they meet the stated
requirements," and policyholders may waive this coverage in
writing.s Once the policy is issued, the insurer must enter into
a reinsurance agreement with the state for the total amount of
the policy.8 6 While the specific provisions of this act have yet to
be completed, their implementation should certainly lead to fewer
law suits between coal companies and aggrieved surface owners.87
IV.

EFFECT OF REGULATION ON THE

Island Creek

DOCTRINE

The remaining consideration concerns what effect these new
legislative measures will have on the Island Creek doctrine.
Although the Kentucky Court of Appeals held Island Creek
strictly liable for subsidence damage even though superseding
causes had occurred, the result may have been different under
SMCRA and the corresponding Kentucky statutes 8 Island
Creek's downfall was its lack of evidence.8 9 The company could
not prove that adequate support had been left in the mine
underlying the Rodgers' home; thus, it could not prove that
Cimarron's blasting had caused the subsidence.
Under the new regulations, mining companies such as Island
Creek would have documented evidence concerning the mine's
condition when closed. At trial, reports made by mine inspectors
could be introduced. Furthermore, mine owners could show that

KRS § 304.44-030 to -060 (Supp. 1984).
14Id. Counties may be excluded if there are no underground coal mines, or if the
availability of mine subsidence insurance has not been voted upon.
Id.
KRS § 304.44-050 (Supp. 1984).
" While this program does result in homeowners bearing part of the liability costs,
it will afford greater protection when a mine has been abandoned and the record owner
cannot be located.
" The Rodgers' cause of action occurred in 1977; SMCRA was passed in 1977,
and the Kentucky act became effective in 1982. Thus, these regulations had no effect
on the outcome of Island Creek.
- See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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their performance bond had been returned, indicating compliance with established standards. 90 Armed with this evidence,
companies could more easily prove that adequate support existed
in the mine and could therefore shift total liability to the codefendant.
Unfortunately, however, all of these new regulations apply
only to mining operations begun after the laws were passed. 91
For subsidence damage resulting from any pre-1977 mining operations, the mine operators are still liable under the Island
92
Creek rule. In such cases, the Mine Subsidence Insurance Act
becomes extremely important. Since litigation can be costly and
time-consuming, most surface owners would rather avoid it.
Under the subsidence fund, a property owner can simply file a
claim with the state and completely avoid a battle with the coal
company. 93 This is not to say that mine owners are completely
relieved of liability under the act: the mine owner remains responsible for restitution if the surface owner has chosen not to
receive subsidence insurance or if the amount of repair exceeds
the policy coverage.
The effects of the new regulations concerning subsidence
have yet to be tested. If the rules serve their purpose, the
incidence of subsidence in connection with new mines should
decrease significantly. Furthermore, the subsidence insurance fund
should decrease subsidence litigation in Kentucky. For those
cases, however, which fall outside the legislative spectrum, the
Island Creek rule will continue to apply, forcing mine operators
to be prepared to pay for subsidence damage which may occur
through no fault of their own.

- Under 405 KAR 10:040E (1982), a performance bond will not be returned until
the mine operator shows substantial compliance with its permit. But cf. In re: Permanent
Surface Mining Regulation Litigation II, No. 79-1144 (DDC October 1, 1984) (bonding
does not apply to coverage for subsidence damage).
• 405 KAR 3:020E § 1 (1982).
92 KRS § 304.44-010 to -130 (Supp. 1984).
93 However,
if the claim exceeds $50,000, the surface owner must litigate for the
excess amount. See KRS § 304.44-030 (Supp. 1984) which reads in part: "The total
insured value reinsured by the administrator shall not exceed fifty thousand dollars
($50,000) per structure. The insurer shall not be required to write a policy for mine
subsidence coverage in excess of the amount reimbursable from the fund as authorized
by this subtitle."
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CONCLUSION

The Island Creek decision demonstrates the Kentucky courts'
eagerness to extend surface owners' protection at the mining
companies' expense. The Court of Appeals ignored the traditional definition of an area's "natural state" in order to expand
the theory of strict liability in subsidence litigation. Although
the decision may have been equitable and just in this particular
case, the general rules laid down in Island Creek are too broad.
Such an ill-defined area of liability will almost certainly be
misconstrued and carried beyond reasonable and just bounds.
An effort should be made by the courts to narrow this definition
and make provisions for consideration of evidence of superseding causes in order to curtail increased litigation between surface
owners and mine operators. The recent legislation should help
control the incidence of subsidence through better mining techniques. In addition, subsidence litigation may decrease as alternative sources of recovery become available. Whatever the impact
of this legislation, however, mine operators must be prepared to
assume additional liability as long as the Island Creek doctrine
remains viable.
S. Michele Manning

